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Introduction .
After nearly a decade of declining rates of price increase, the
Brazilian economy suffered an inflationary relapse following the 1973 oil
crisis. Unlike the relatively brief "oil inflations" of many other
nations, Brazil's inflation has persisted, and remains a serious problem
at this writing. Brazil's inflation problems have been compounded by
severe disarray in the nation's short-term financial markets. Now it is
clear that the Brazilian inflation is much more than an "oil" inflation.
Analysts of the Brazilian economy have vigorously debated the causes of
the persisting inflation and the financial turbulence, without reaching
broad agreement. There is a widespread suspicion, however, that one of
the important causes of Brazil's macro-economic stabilization problems is
the availability of index-linked financial assets. The purpose of the
present essay is to examine this possibility.
Before turning to discuss the Brazilian "inflation-feedback" process,
and the role that financial index-linking might play in this process, we
briefly review Brazil's experiment with financial index-linking. Index-
linked financial assets have been available in Brazil since 1964, when a
military government assumed power. The new government inherited a large
budget deficit of some years ' standing, as well as the consequent inflation
(which reached an annual rate of 100 per cent in early 1964). On the ad-
vice of its civilian economics ministers, the new government introduced
index-linked government bonds as a means of financing the deficit with a
minimum of money creation. Their reasoning was that Brazilian financial
investors would obviously not purchase nominal government obligations
2
while the future rate of inflation remained high and unpredictable.
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Since the government felt that it could not bring the budget under control
immediately, and since the government preferred to control the inflation
gradually in order to avoid widespread bankruptcies and severe depression,
it seemed inevitable that tne inflation would persist at high rates for
several years. The index-linked bonds were thus intended as a temporary
means of mitigating the inflationary effect of the government deficit
while the inflation persisted. In the event, the rate of inflation fell
even more gradually than the government had hoped, and financial index-
linking ceased to be a stop-gap expedient and became an institutionalized
means of "living with inflation."
Since their introduction the government bonds have been readjusted
according to the Brazilian wholesale price index lagged by several months.
The precise formula for the readjustment has been altered several times
(see the explanatory note to Table 3). At least until 1975 and 1976,
when fundamental changes were made in the raadjustment formula, the
government bonds have probably been as close to perfect inflation hedges
as was technically feasible in Brazil. This is shown in Tables 2 and 3,
which present the nominal and deflated values of the government-bond
principals since 1964. After 1964 the bonds were clearly successful as
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a means of financing the government deficit. (See Tables 4 and 5).
The government extended the index-linking principle to other areas
of the economy, particularly to the important national Housing Finance
System, which was set up between 1964 and 1966 in an attempt to resolve
Brazil's desperate housing shortage. The private and public agencies
of the Housing Finance System capture savings through index-linked "housing
bonds" and passbook savings accounts. The principal social-security fund
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of the future rate of inflation, the "pre-fixed" index-linking procedure
has functioned essentially as a means of controlling nominal rates.
Given the persistent if declining inflation of the 1964-1973 period,
it is difficult to deny that financial index-linking permitted Brazil
certain important economic achievements. The government deficit, which
persisted until 1973, was largely financed in a non-inflationary form.
The housing sector accumulated a massive volume of savings, which has come
to be applied not only to housing but to municipal infrastructure, and has
generated considerable employment in the construction industry. Financial
investors and household savers have had inflation-resistant assets in
which to hold their wealth, and there is no question that the forced-
savings schemes would have been inconceivable without their being pro-
tected against the erosion of their real value.
Nevertheless, the Brazilian public has never been very happy about
the experiment with index-linking. For one thing, understandably enough,
Brazilians have never liked to take on inflation-proofed debt, and this
has been the major reason why private financial institutions outside the
Housing Finance System have been unable to use index-linking. Even the
Housing Finance System was forced to compromise the index-linking principle
for mortgages: mortgages are now re-adjusted through a complicated scheme
under which the monthly payments of amortization and interest calculated
when the mortgage is signed are adjusted annually according to the govern-
ment's annual wage guidelines. (The Brazilian government has generally
maintained a tight wage policy since 1965.) Brazilian consumers are per-
suaded that any index-linked debt would mushroom unreasonably, if not turn
perpetual; Brazilian businessman fear that the prices of their own products
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is applied in index-linked accounts to the National Housing Bank, which
is the central financial and coordinating agency of the Housing Finance
System. The National Housing System came to account for virtually all
of Brazil's index-linked savings stock by the late 1960s. Since then the
government has also established several other index-linked "forced-savings"
funds. Certain state-owned enterprises (notably the national electrical-
infrastructure company, EletrobrSs) have issued index-linked debentures;
and several state and municipal governments have issued index-linked
obligations.
Despite the efforts of the government to encourage them, however,
private corporations and financial institutions have proven reluctant
to issue index-linked obligations. The reasons for this reluctance are
disputed by economists. The view of this writer is that such enterprises
have been unwilling to take on index-linked obligations backed by current
assets that cannot, by their nature, be proof against inflation with
certainty. For private commercial banks, finance companies, investment
banks, and the government's development banks (which remain to this day
the only domestic source of long-term industrial finance), the government
has allowed the use of what it calls "pre-fixed" index-linking, through
which the securities and loans of such institutions carry a government
estimate of the percentage increase in the price level over the term of
the contract, in addition to the legal maximum interest rate of 12 per cent
per year. (The usury law limiting interest to 12 per cent per year remains
in force, although it is now defined for legal purposes as net of inflation.)
The government has generally tried to control nominal interest rates. Con-
sequently, since the government had discretionary power to set the estimate
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through several channels. The introduction of financial index-linking
effectively opens some channels and suppresses others. Therefore we
cannot be absolutely certain that the Brazilian inflation-feedback
mechanism would be less robust if index-linking had never been introduced.
Section I presents our theoretical discussion, and Section II pre-
sents our examination of the Brazilian data.
I. Channels of the "inflation-feedback" process
.
The macro-economic "inflation-feedback" process which we describe
here operates essentially through the formation of inflationary expec-
tations and uncertainty. As a broad generalization, an increase in the
rate of price increase typically leads to increases in inflationary ex-
pectations and uncertainty; these increases set off the feedback
process.. For brevity, allow us to refer henceforth to an increase in the
rate of inflation that causes increases in the expected rate of Inflation
and in the uncertainty attaching to this expectation as "an inflationary
deterioration." Let us briefly review the reasons why an inflationary
deterioration will be likely to have inflationary effects on the rates
of saving and investment and on the demand for and supply of money; then
we ask vrhether the introduction of financial index-linking would be likely
to diminish or augment these inflationary effects.
Suppose first that no index-linked assets are available in the
economy,. An inflationary deterioration would probably decrease the rate
of savings, which would be inflationary, for the following reasons:
first, because consumers would prefer to purchase durable goods sooner
rather than later when their prices (might) rise; second, because the
expected real interest rate on savings is reduced; and third, because
-5-
would fail to maintain pace with, the price index. Thus, while Brazilians
are pleased to be able to hold index-linked assets, they remain quite un-
willing to hold index-linked debt.
The most widespread misgiving about index-linking among Brazilians
has been the conviction that it somehow strengthens the "inflation-
feedback" mechanism. The general argument is that current inflation is
caused only in part by current demand-pull and cost-push factors: it is
caused also by the inflation that occurred in the recent past. The
earlier inflation, it is argued, "feeds back" through the formation of
expectations and the force of previous commitments to generate infla-
tionary pressure in the current period. Now such a feedback mechanism
undoubtedly exists in any economy. Brazilians, however, have come to
believe, as a virtual truism, that index-linking has made their feedback •
mechanism particularly robust. Some of the most enthusiastic Brazilian
proponents of index -linking have admitted that they accept this view.
Nevertheless, there has been little theoretical analysis to substantiate
the view that financial index-linking strengthens the feedback mechanism.
There is even some empirical evidence in a recent paper by Cliudio Contador
9
that seems to suggest that index-linking has had no such effect in Brazil,
although we will argue below that Contador 's results must be interpreted
carefully.
In this essay, we will argue that the availability of index-linked
assets can serve to propagate inflation forward through time, and more-
over, we will argue that the data on the Brazilian experience between
1972 and 1976 arc quite consistent with our theoretical analysis. We
will also argue, however, that tue inflation-feedback process operates
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the uncertainty attaching to this real rate is increased. (These effects
on the savings rate will be offset, if the initial real interest rate is
high on a backward-bending savings-supply curve, and to the extent that
the public responds to an increase in inflationary uncertainty by saving
more rather than less, in an attempt to maintain the real savings stock
for precautionary purposes.)
An inflationary deterioration would probably increase the rate of
investments which would also be inflationary. This would happen, first,
because of the decrease in the expected real rate of interest, which en-
tails both a reduction in the expected real cost of borrowed funds and
an increase in the valuation of equity, and hence a reduction in the cost
of capital perceived by firms; and second, because of the increased uncer-
tainty attaching to the expected real rates of return on money, which
would probably generate an increase in the valuation of equity. (These
effects on the investment; rate will be offset to the extent that the
increased inflationary uncertainty turns the prospective cash flow on
possible investment projects more unpredictable.)
Next, an inflationary deterioration would surely decrease the demand
for money, which would be inflationary . This is because the expected real
rates of return on assets competing with money
—
with the exception of nomi-
nal bonds and nominal savings instruments—will now be higher relative to
the expected real rate of return on money. In addition, the uncertainty
attaching to the expected real rate of return on money will be increased,
and in general this should also serve to decrease the demand for money.
Finally, an inflationary deterioration is quite likely to force an
increase in the money supply, through its effects on the composition of
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the banking system's assets and liabilities. This happens in the following
way. One likely consequence of an inflationary deterioration will be an
attempt by the public to run its demand deposits as low as possible, and
to move its wealth out of money and into inflation-resistant assets
—
capital goods, real estate, jewelry, foreign exchange, and so on. At the
same time, however, there will probably be a sharp increase in the demand
for bank credit, first, because as part of the inflationary process the
real prices paid and received by firms will be altered considerably; and
second, because the inflation was not anticipated when contracts currently
in force were originally signed. Both of these effects tend to generate
situations in which firms are compelled to ask for credit. Hence the
immediate consequence of an inflationary deterioration is quite likely to
be, ironically, a liquidity crisis in the commercial-banking system. Now
this places the monetary authority in a dilemma: Should it attempt to
confront the inflation or the liquidity crisis? Obviously, the authority
will feel political pressure on both sides. At first the authority may
try to confront the inflation by tightening credit, or by at least allowing
the liquidity crisis to "run its course." But this is likely to provoke
some bankruptcies, and perhaps a recession. This will alarm the authority,
and probably force its hand politically. It will then permit bank-credit
expansion, which almost inevitably entails an inflationary increase in
the money supply.
This cycle of tight and easy credit is familiar to observers of
developing nations, particularly in Latin America. The cycle is espe-
cially likely to appear in nations where commercial-bank credit is
important, where commercial banks and their creditors are politically
powerful, where there are frequent brusque shifts in anticipations and
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index-linking. In a regime without index-linking, only equities and
real assets are available as a hedge against inflation, and these assets
are uncertain hedges at best. The discount on nominal bonds may be in-
creased to take account of an increase in the expected rate of inflation,
but the bonds are still subject to the same degree of inflationary uncer-
tainty as money. Where index-linked bonds are available, in contrast,
wealth holders can protect their real wealth with certainty by acquiring
such bonds. An inflationary deterioration would therefore generate more
of a departure from money where index-linked assets are available than
where they are not. Moreover, an inflationary deterioration will prob-
ably place the commercial-banking system under more acute pressure where
index-linked assets are available, because the effective flow of real
resources out of the banking system should be far more efficient. With-
out index-linked assets available, there are considerable transactions
costs to obtaining even uncertain protection from inflation for wealth:
some real estate must be found, dollars must be purchased on the black
market, and so on. Index-linked securities, on the other hand, would be
liquid, legal, readily available in any demoninatlon, and virtually per-
fect hedges against inflation. Money holdings can be converted all too
easily into index-linked assets. Consequently the real value of each
new injection of money into the banking system will be decreased, through
increases in the price level, far more rapidly as people move their wealth
out of money and into index-linked assets.
To summarize, the introduction of financial index-linking diminishes
the inflationary consequence of an inflationary deterioration on savings
and investment (i.e., on the "IS"), but augments the inflationary con-
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aggregate-supply conditions, and where the monetary authority lacks
12institutional power.
Now let us suppose that index-linked financial assets become avail-
able in the economy. How would this change the inflation-feedback
mechanisms that we have described?
First, consider the savings and investment functions. If the savings
media are index-linked, then an inflationary deterioration should have no
effect on the expected real rate of interest on savings: an index-linked
fixed-return asset is, virtually by definition, an asset with a certain
,
fixed real rate of return. Hence there should be relatively little reason
for savings to decrease following an inflationary deterioration. If in-
vestment-finance instruments are index-linked, capital investors should
reason that, to the extent that higher future returns anticipated on a
given investment project are part of an anticipated inflationary trend,
these returns would go to pay the cost of the finance. Moreover, if
index-linked assets compete with equities in the financial markets, in-
creases in inflationary expectations and uncertainty should have a smaller
positive effect on the valuation of equity. Consequently, an inflationary
deterioration should have a smaller inflationary effect on savings and
investment in a regime with index-linking than in a regime without index-
linking. (For future reference, note that the bulk of Brazil's investment-
financial instruments are not index-linked, although medium-term govern-
ment bonds and savings instruments are index-linked.)
On the other hand, an inflationary deterioration should have a greater
inflationary effect on the demand for and supply of money in a regime with
-12-
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oil prices inevitably had a cost-inflationary effect. In April 1974
there was a major bank failure: one of the nation's largest banking
houses, the Halles Group, was placed under "intervention" by the monetary
authority, and a large quantity of credit expansion had to be permitted
in order to prevent the Halles failure from generating a wider financial
panic. Several actions of the new government that took office in March
1974 probably also had inflationary consequences. Beginning with the
annual minimum-wage adjustment of May 1974
s
the government began to set
rather higher guidelines for collective wage contracts, in an attempt to
increase real wages (both on the view that since 1964 labor had not re-
ceived a fair share of the nation r s economic expansion and in the hope
that increased wages would generate greater consumer demand) . In August
1974 the government published its "Second National Development Plan,"
through which it hoped, first, to de-centralize Brazil's industrial growth
away from the congested Rio de Janeiro-Sac Paulo-Belo Horizon te growth
poles, and, more important, to promote the nation's basic-inputs indus-
tries, whose growth had lagged dangerously behind that of Brazil's con-
sumer-durables industries. Now one of the aims of the new five-year plan
was to forestall the inflationary pressure that the structural imbalance
seemed to be generating. Ironically, however, the very announcement of
the Second National Development Plan probably itself constituted an in-
flationary shock. The plan was not only extremely ambitious; it assigned
the key role to new investments by industries owned by the government,
to be financed by funds captured by the government's development banks.
Accordingly, it generated widespread fears in Brazil's already hard-pressed
private sector that its demand for credit would be crowded out. (In
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sequence of an inflationary deterioration on the demand for and supply
of money (i.e., on the "LM") . Without additional information, however,
we cannot say whether the effect on the IS of introducing financial inaex-
13linking would be more important than the effect on the LM. ' Therefore,
we cannot say for sure whether index-linking renders the inflation-feed-
back mechanism more or less robust.
II. The inflation-feedback mechanism in recent Brazilian experience .
In this Section we consider the facts of the recent Brazilian infla-
tionary experience. We begin by describing the "inflationary deterior-
ation" that set off the resurgence of inflation in 1974. We then describe
the evidence from Brazilian financial statistics that the demand-for-money
function was shifted back by the inflationary deterioration. Next, we
provide evidence that the Brazilian banking system went into a liquidity
crisis at the end of 1974, and that the monetary expansion of 1975 was a
response to this crisis. Finally, we briefly review Claudio Contador's
empirical evidence against the view that index-linking has turned Brazil's
inflation-feedback mechanism more robust: we argue that Contador's results
do not really contradict the analysis of the present essay.
A. The "inflationary deterioration" of 1974.
A number of inflationary shocks occurred during 1973 and 1974 in the
Brazilian economy. All of them probably contributed to the 1974 resur-
gence of inflation, although their relative importance is open to question.
The first inflationary shock was the world oil-price increase in October
1973: since Brazil is heavily dependent on oil imports (about 80 per cent
of Brazil's oil consumption must be imported), the heavy increase in world
-14-
The relative importance of the changes that we have noted in setting
off Brazil's inflationary resurgence is open to debate. (It is worth
noting, however, that for once in Latin-American inflationary experience
a government-budget deficit cannot be held to blame for an inflation:
beginning in 1973 Brazil's annual federal budget has actually been in
surplus.) But there can be little doubt about their consequences: in
1974 and 1975 Brazil's general price index rose by 34.5 per cent and 29.2
per cent respectively, whereas the rates of increase for 1970, 1971, 1972
and 1973 had been 19.2, 19.8, 15.5 and 15.7 respectively. Furthermore,
the rate of inflation worsened in 1976: for that year the general price
level rose 46.4 per cent, and only with great difficulty the government
managed to reduce the rate of price increase to 29.2 per cent in 1977.
Now in view of the inflationary shocks of 1973 and 1974 it was quite
understandable that Brazil's rate of inflation rose sharply in 1975. But
how are we to explain the sustained inflation after 1974? Our argument
is that during 1974 and 1975 the inflation-feedback mechanism propagated
the inflationary shocks of 1973 and 1974 forward through time. Since
index-linked financial assets were available in Brazil, the inflation-
feedback mechanism operated principally through the demand-for-money and
the supply-of-money functions. Let us examine each of these in turn.
B. The Brazilian demand-for-money function in 1974.
The basic data for the analysis of the Brazilian demand for money are
presented in Tables 9-13. As inflation, inflationary expectations, and
inflationary uncertainty rose during 1974, following years of declining
rates of inflation, the Brazilian public responded by shifting its wealth
-13-
the event the Plan proved too ambitious to carry out, and by 1975 it was
largely allowed to lapse.) Yet another event that was probably a kind
of inflationary shock came in November 1974: in spite of the opposition
of a good part of military and business opinion, the government carried
out the first relatively free nationwide elections for congress since 1965.
The opposition political party made important gains throughout the nation,
and Brazilian business passed through a period of considerable uncertainty,
concerned that the changed political equation might have unfavorable
15
consequences.
The situation was complicated by the growing problems in Brazil's
international economic sphere. Since 1968 Brazil had maintained real
output growth above nine per cent per year, led in large part by expansion
of exports. Brazil managed to maintain its output growth through most
of 1974—for the year as a whole its real national product grew 9.5 per
cent. But the OECD nations, Brazil's main customers, reported a reduction
of 0.2 per cent in their incomes, and moreover had to direct a larger share
of their import expenditure to oil. Brazil's non-oil imports continued to
increase, and at first the government took no steps to contain this in-
crease because it still felt that it could still maintain export growth.
On top of the credit expansion permitted by the government to relieve
the confidence crisis caused by the Halles collapse, the government allowed
credit to expand to agricultural and industrial exporters, in part to tide
them over while foreign demand remained in recession, in part to stimulate
export production. In the event Brazil had a current-account deficit of
almost US$7 billin in 1974, compared with a deficit under US$2 billion
the previous year; and the nation's total foreign debt rose from US$12.6
billion to US$17.2 billion. 16
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by 3.5 per cent in real terms, whereas in 1971, 1972 and 1973 their total
real deposits had increased by 17.8, 23.2, and 20.7 per cent respectively.
(See Table 11.) Real deposits in the Banco do Brasil, the government's
commercial bank, increased by 5.1 per cent over 1974 (see Table 13),
compared with increases of 7.2 and 32.2 per cent in 1972 and 1973; vir-
tually all of the 1974 increase took place during the first three months
of the year. During 1974 the Brazilian public was allowing its real
money balances to fall slightly, despite an increase in real gross
national product of 9.5 per cent, just as it was allowing its real
holdings of non-monetary nominal assets to fall. This was the natural
effect on the demand for money of the inflationary deterioration in an
economy in which index-linked assets were available,
This interpretation of the shift in Brazilian asset-holding patterns
begs a number of interesting questions. Before discussing the consequences
of the inflationary deterioration on the supply of money, let us digress
to consider these.
First, why couldn't the rates offered on nominal assets simply rise
to meet the competition of index-linked assets? It is clear that the nominal
rates on time deposits with pre-fixed index-linking were barely permitted to
rise at all during 1974, and the effective prohibition on paying interest on
commercial-bank demand deposits was maintained as before. For want of data,
it is not possible to determine the precise response of the discount on such
short-term nominal securities as exchange acceptances and certificates of de-
posit during 1974; although it apparently rose slightly it could not rise
sufficiently to stem the shift of investors away from holding these assets.
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out of monetary and other nominal assets and into index-linked assets.
The magnitude of the shift can be seen in Tables 9 and 10. In Table 9,
we can observe that while in 1972 and 1973 roughly 24 per cent of gross
domestic savings was carried out in the form of nominal non-monetary
assets (i.e., nominal time deposits, with pre-fixed index-linking;
exchange acceptances; and government bills), in 1974 only 9 per cent of
gross domestic financial savings was carried out in this form. Table 10
provides evidence for a related point: during 1974 the nominal stock of
passbook-savings accounts in the Housing Finance System increased by 104.8
per cent, the nominal 3tock of private holdings of index-linked govern-
ment bonds increased by 58.3 per cent, and the nominal stock of private
holdings of index-linked state and municipal bonds increased by 67.6
per cent; at the, same time the nominal stock of nominal time deposits
increased only 8 per cent, the nominal stock of exchange acceptances in-
creased by 22.4 per cent, and the nominal stock of government bills held
by the public increased by 14.2 per cent. Since the general price level
rose by 34.5 per cent over 1974, it is clear that in real terms the stock
of each category of index-linked assets rose considerably, while the
stock of each category of non-monetary nominal assets actually declined.
Most interesting for our purposes, the inflationary deterioration
clearly affected the demand for real money balances adversely. In real
terms the money supply (M-l) actually fell by 0.8 per cent over 1974, even
though the nominal money supply increased by 33.5 per cent. For compari-
son, during 1972 and 1973 the real money supply had increased by 19.7 and
27.0 per cent respectively. (Sea Table 12.) Private commercial banks
were particularly hard-pressed: over 1974 their total real deposits fell
-18-
bank would tend to prefer not to: higher lending rates would increase the
likelihood that creditors would default, particularly in view of the uncer-
tain circumstances and the real-price "dispersal" that inevitably accompany
an increased rate of inflation. Furthermore, a commercial bank would have
to change its deposit rate frequently and perhaps very sharply in order for
its deposit accounts to compete with index-linked assets. Nominal assets
compete disadvantageously with index-linked assets xn a period of rising
inflation, not only because the expected real rate of interest on nominal
assets cannot match the rate offered on index-linked assets, but because
the real rate on a nominal asset is uncertain, whereas the real rate on an
index-linked asset is not. Thus if commercial banks were to attempt to com-
pete with index-linked assets through the deposit rate, they would have to
offer a relatively high nominal rate—some component of which would in ef-
feet be a risk premium to the depositor—and they would have to vary the rate
frequently. This would turn the banks 1 operations unacceptable volatile.
Non-bank financial intermediaries are in a somewhat more difficult
position, because they do not receive transactions balances. They can
still function in an inflationary context with relatively low rates on
the instruments that they sell to the public, however, mainly because
their largest purchasers are enterprises with fluctuating cash balances.
Such enterprises should be willing enough to purchase short-term nominal
securities, because they are liquid, and because even if their real rate
of return is negative, it will assuredly be higher by their nominal rate
than the real rate of return on money. In Brazil the lending rates of the
non-bank financial intermediaries are generally controlled by the monetary
authority, and the competing bank-loan rates are usually relatively low
-17-
In part, the problem was that controls were retained throughout the year
on the loans financed by these securities. (See Table 13.)
There are some fundamental reasons why the rates on nominal assets
could not rise to meet the competition of index-linked assets. Consider
the situation of commercial banks. The deposit rate in Brazilian commercial
banks was limited, by regulation, to zero; but in any case these banks had
little incentive to raise their deposit rates in response to increased in-
flation. Their lending rates were subject to official controls through the
mechanism of pre-fixed index-linking (although to some extent the banks
were able to earn more than the legal limit through such devices as
banking commissions and compensating balances, and besides, Brazilian
commercial banks have traditionally rationed credit heavily) . In these
circumstances the banks' profit rates were at least adequate, regardless
of the rate of inflation, because whatever increased inflation took from
the real rate of interest earned by the banks on their loans it also took
from the real rate of interest paid by the banks on their deposits. It
makes little difference to a bank if it "earns," say, real interest of
minus 10 per cent on its loans if it "pays" real interest of minus 40
per cent on its deposits—it Is still earning a spread of 30 per cent.
And even If the real deposit rate is very negative, commercial banks
will not find themselves entirely without funds, for the public must hold
some demand deposits for transactions purposes.
True, a bank might be able to attract more resources if it offered
a higher rate of return on its deposits, and these resources could prob-
ably be lent out profitably. But a commercial bank that paid a higher
deposit rate would have to charge a higher lending rate, and a risk-averse
-20-
unit would be changed: instead of the cruzeiro , the monetary unit would
effectively become the index-linked cruzeiro . Prices would then come to be
set in terms of index-linked cruzeiros , and the true measure of inflation
would be the index-linked cruzeiro prince index. The ordinary cruzeiro-
price index would be irrelevant. r/»hataver previously caused inflation
through creation of cruzeiros would now cause inflation through creation
of index-linked cruzeiros , and the economy would be right back where it
started before index-linking was introduced. This observation amounts
to a description of what index-linking really is: index-linking is the
institution of a second monetary unit alongside the unit of the circu-
lating medium. The advantages and problems of index-linking both arise
from the fact that while this second monetary unit is not subject to
inflationary uncertainty, the exchange rate between the two monetary
units is subject to inflationary uncertainty; moreover, the second mone-
tary unit cannot be used for transactions purposes.
C. The Brazilian supply of money, 1974-1976.
The radical shift in asset-holding patterns that took place during
1974 inevitably brought a more institutional inflation-feedback mechanism
into play: the monetary author! ty found itself forced to permit the
inflation to continue. There were further inflationary shocks after 1974:
for example, in mid-1975 there was a series of agricultural disasters
throughout the country, which not only caused supply problems but
occasioned an inflationary credit expansion. We will argue here, how-
ever, that the shift in asset-holding patterns in 1974 was, by itself,
a significant source of pressure on the monetary authority to inflate.
-19-
for the reasons we have given. f(>n the other hand, the demand for credit
from non-bank financial intermediaries is always heavy, particularly be-
cause of the banks' rationing practices, and there is usually considerable
upward pressure on the lending rates.) Again, as long as they maintain a
positive spread between their lending and borrowing rates, non-bank finan-
cial intermediaries can maintain themselves well enough even if their bor-
rowing rate is negative. The situation of such financial institutions is
more precarious than that of conmercial banks, and the more so where there
is inflation. Marketable paper can carry a discount, and so the real
interest rate in this market can vary much more than the real rate on bank
deposits. The discount notwithstanding, money-market instruments will be
able to compete effectively with index-linked assets only if they are sold
for very short terms. For longer terms the inflationary uncertainty at-
taching to the real rate on nominal paper becomes too high.
But then, one might ask, why not institute index-linking more compre-
hensively—why not require commercial banks and non-bank financial inter-
mediaries to index-link both their lending and deposit rates? For one
thing, short-term borrowers would not stand for it. Commercial credit
is generally re-paid from sales and accounts receivable: by their nature,
these cannot be made proof against inflation. But even if commercial-
bank loans could be index-linked, it must be remembered that a signi-
ficant part of commercial banks' assets are held in the form of cash
—
required reserves and vault cash. In order for commercial banks to index-
link their demand deposits, their reserves must be index-linked—which
is to say, the money supply as a whole must be index-linked. But that
would be pointless. If the currency unit were index-linked, the currency
-22-
temporary relief to the banks without—it was hoped—interfering with the
government's longer-run stabilisation effort. Altogether an amount equal
to approxiatately 10 per cent of the money supply was loaned out under the
facility to the commercial banks, who used it to expand their loans . (See
Table 11.) The increased liquidity had a stimulating effect on the economy,
and although it was of course inflationary, the government hoped that it
could reign in the money supply again when conditions improved. Unfor-
tunately, the availability of index-linked assets maintained the infla-
tion-feedback mechanism as robust as ever: the stock of index-linked
assets grew by almost as much as it had in the previous year (see Table
10) , and the real money supply increased very slowly (see Table 12)
,
barely making up the fall in the real money supply during the first part
of the year,
A furiiier development complicated the financial situation in 1975.
During this year the money markets turned hyper-active in Brazil's
principal financial centers, The money market's rates and volumes rose
heavily, and became highly variable; the maturities of money-market paper
shortened drastically. .Non-bank financial intermediaries came increasingly
to employ a characteristically new mode of operation in their competition
for resources with index-linked assets: the "re-purchase letter." The re-
purchase letter was a document accompanying the sale of a security, such
as an exchange acceptance or a certificate of deposit, promising that the
seller of the security would re-purchase the security after a given number
of days at a specified price. In such a transaction the re-purchase letter
became the true financial instrument, and the security merely collateral.
Since the re-purchase letters were generally of extremely short maturity.
-21-
It Is clear that by the end of 1974 the government had become pain-
fully aware that the shift out of nominal assets into index-linked assets
was causing a liquidity crisis in the banking system and causing severe
18
problems for the financial system generally. In November 1974 the
government took several measures to mitigate the asset shift: the National
Housing Bank effectively prohibited anyone but private individuals from
maintaining index-linked passbook savings accounts in the Housing Finance
System, and also reduced the grace period after the start of each month
for deposits in passbook savings accounts during which new deposits would
19be treated as though they had been made on the first of the month.
The critical problem was the situation of the commercial banks, however.
The demand for loans that they faced rose considerably throughout the year,
undoubtedly by considerably, more in nominal terms than the rate of in
view of the severe real economic problems, while deposits fell in real
terms. The banks clearly tried to meet some of this loan demand. For
the first time their ratio of loans to deposits rose above one, and their
real loans increased. (See Table 11.) By the beginning of 1975 their
credit tightness had reached severe proportions, and there is clear
evidence that after October 1975 the economy suffered an industrial re-
20
cession that threatened to become very serious.
This situation left the monetary authority little choice. Hence,
in late February 1975 it began an expansionary monetary policy by re-
ducing required reserve ratios. The magnitude of the expansion was in-
creased during March and April, when a special six-month loan facility
was made available to the private commercial-banking system. This facil-
ity, known as the "Compensatory Re-financing," was intended to provide
-24-
and providing emergency loans to others since the Halles collapse in 1974,
at.d during 1975 and 1976 it had to provide increased support; during
these two years the monetary authority's credits to non-bank financial
institutions increased by 71.4 and 150 per cent respectively, These
credits alone amounted to IS and 36 per cent of the respective increases
iti the monetary base in these two years, and therefore must be regarded
as; a major cause of the 46.4 per cent increase in the general price level
that occurred over 1976. (The remainder of the 1975 and 1976 growth in
the monetary base is accounted for by Central Bank credit to commercial
beinks, the expansion of demand deposits/credit of the government-owned
Bcinco do Brasil, and—after 1976-—the growth of foreign reserves. Since
the Banco do Brasil is not subject to the required-reserve ratio, its
deposits are part of ten monetary base. And although to avoid complication
we have deliberately avoided discussing Brazil's foreign financial rela-
tions in this essay, it should be noted that Brazil is very much an open
economy where credit is concerned: foreign banks have remained willing
to supply credit to Brazil in spite of Brazil's economic difficulties,
and so at times whan domestic credit became tight, Brazilian enterprises
naturally turned to foreign sources.)
To summarize, the role of financial index-linking in forcing increases
in the Brazilian money supply must be regarded as critical. Simply put,
the availability of index-linked assets placed severe pressure on monetary
institutions whenever there was an inflationary deterioration, as the
Brazilian public sought to reduce its real money holdings in favor of
index-linked assets. The Brazilian monetary authority has been obliged
to respond to the run from real money by replenishing the money supply,
-23-
their real rate of return w.-.s subject to relatively little inflationary
uncertainty . Thus they could compete effectively with index-linked asset*..
Their drawback, of course, was that they went to finance business and
commercial loans of longer terms, while the money-market rates might
fluctuate considerably. Funds were thus attracted back into the nominal
sector of the economy, particularly since firms could no longer hold fundti
in passbook savings accounts, and since the public believed, in view of the
fact that the government was carxying out an expansionary monetary policy
that it was best to buy such securities now before their real rates of
return went down. This money market has come to be known in Brazil as "o_
Open Market" (the English expression is used), because it employs the
same financial infrastructure that is used for transactions in the govern-
ment's (nominal) bills and (index-linked) bonds.
Severe problems developed toward the end of 1975, however, when the
government shifted course and tried to return to a contractionary monetary
policy. At the same time the "Compeastory He-financing" loan came due; in
anticipation of the due date of the huge facility, the banks had gone heavily
into government bills. Between, roughly speaking, September and November,
a massive amount of paper poured on to the Open Market, as the commercial
banks sought to go into cash to pay back the loan and investors sought
to dispose of securities that would probably now suffer a capital loss.
As the short-term rates rose sharply, many financial institutions found
themselves in deep trouble. This event is generally described as the
first "Open crisis"—further crises were to ensue in 1976 as the monetary
authority tried to tighten its policy but sometimes had to loosen credit.
The monetary authority had been intervening in some financial institutions
rates of inflation (which stands to reason, since the adjustment of
index-linked assets is based, on a moving average of the rates of infla-
tion between three and six months before) ; (ii) quarterly regression
analysis using an Almon lag shows a weak, statistically not significant
relationship between the current rate of inflation and lagged rates of
adjustment; and (iii) spectral analysis finds that the rate of adjust-
ment has no leading effect or. the current rate, of inflation, either for
short- or long-run analysis. Contador concludes that "the empirical
tests leave little margin of doubt that index-linking does not feed back
into the inflationary process in Brazil ."* How can we reconcile
his results with the analysis that we have given above?
As follows: Br, Contador and the present writer are really dis-
cussing two different feedback processes, Dr. Contador 's empirical
analysis establishes that the adjustment of index-linked assets does not
apparently propagate inflation through time, This stands to reason,
especially in view of the way that index-linking has been implemented
in Brazil. Since commercial, industrial, and agricultural credit is
generally not index-linked, there is little reason for adjustment of
index-linked assets to be translated into cost pressure; moreover, the
additional income received by savers and financial investors on index-
linked assets is generally also saved, and thus adds little to aggregate
expenditure. The argument of the present essay, on the other hand, is
that the availabilitv of index-linked assets, rather than their adjustment
per se , is a key element in the inflation-feedback process: earlier in-
creases in the rate of inflation, operating through formation of inflation-
ary expectations and uncertainty, affect the current rate of inflation
-25-
and this served to propagate the inflation forward through time. The
Brazilian government has been well aware that index-linked assets have
been placing a severe strain on the nation's financial system: in
August 1975 it announced that henceforth it reserved the right to edit
"accidental" price increases, i.e., price increases resulting from
aggregate-supply shocks such as the agricultural disasters of that year,
out of the index; and in April 1976 the government made a more drastic
change, announcing that henceforth index-linked assets would be corrected
according to the formula
(.8 • I + .2 • 15) per cent (in annual terms),
where I is the rate of increase that would previously have been applied
21
to index-linked securities. The stated purpose of these changes was
to reduce inflation feedback and to relieve the competitive pressure that
financial institutions faced from index-linked assets. It is not clear,
however, how much farther the government can go in the direction of making
index-linked assets less attractive, since the Housing Finance System, the
forced-savings funds, and other institutions have so strong a vested
interest in them.
D. On the evidence from statistical analysis.
In a recent paper Claudio Contador presented a statistical analysis
of the relationship between two Brazilian time series, the rate of infla-
tion and the percentage adjustments applied to outstanding index-linked
assets.*" Contador's results may be summarized briefly as follows:
(i) quarterly regression analysis using an Alraon lag shows a strong
positive relationship between the current rate of adjustment and lagged
-28-
substitute for government policy to control the basic causes of inflation.
Index-linking may be a sensible expedient for a serious stabilization
program, where inflation expectations and uncertainty are cooing down.
It is not a magical device for living painlessly with continuing inflation.
-27-
by stimulating asset-holders to move out of money and into index-linked
assets, thereby effectively decreasing the real value of money and forcing
the monetary authority to increase the money supply.
Conclusion .
We have argued that our evidence from Brazil's recent inflationary
experience suggests strongly that the "inflation-feedback" mechanism
has operated there since 1974 through the availability of index-linked
assets. Does this conclusion amount to an argument that no nation should
introduce financial index-linking? It is difficult to say. In the first
place, as we observed in Section I, we cannot show that the inflation-
feedback mechanism must be more robust where index-linked assets are
available than where they are not available. And second, it cannot be
emphasized too strongly that as long- as the rate of inflation remains
short of hyper-inflationary levels, financial index-linking permits
accumulation of savings and government borrowing from the public. One
must retort, however, that at the same time the competition of index-
linked assets places severe stress on the operations of financial enter-
prises that operate with nominal instruments, and forces the economy to
operate with two currency units with a variable and uncertain exchange
rate—to the inevitable detriment of the transactions-currency unit.
In sum, financial index-linking has its advantages and its draw-
backs. On the one hand, it preserves the value of the national savings
stock in an Inflationary context. On the other hand, it acts to debauch
the national currency and to snarl up the national financial system.
The real conclusion, perhaps, is that for the long run there can be no
-30-
Siegel (1974), Fischer (1975), and Blinder (1977), See Liviatan and
Levhari (1977) for an analysis basically in agreement with the view
of this writer, The Brazilian attempt to Introduce private index-linked
securities is described in "A Nova Lei do Mercado de Capitals & a ResolucSo
No, 21 do Conselho Monetario, " Conj untura EconSmlca , March, 1966, pp. 9-12.
See also Syvrud (1972). pp. 124-126.
6. See Syvrud (1972).
7. See "0 Piano de equivalSncia salarial e a correcSo monata'ria,"
Conj untura EconSmlca, March, 1970, pp. 65-68. See also Beckerman,
("Adjustment for Inflation.,,/' 1978),
8. See Contador (1977).
9. See Contador (1977),
10. This is certainly true if inflationary expectations and uncertainty
are simply adaptive in character. If inflationary expectations are
rational, then there are various possibilities , especially if the rational
expectation takes full account of the feadback process. We are assuming
simply that, whatever the underlying reason, inflationary expectations
are elastic with respect to the rata of inflation.
U. It is theoretically possible, however, that an increase In the
uncertainty attaching to the real rate of inflation would increase the
demand for money. This could happen if the subjective probability dis-
tributions of the real rates of return on money and equities were negatively
correlated.
12. The argument that the liquidity condition of banks may vary according
the expected rate of inflation is similar in spirit to Irving Fisher p s
theory of how the business cycle could be propagated through the banking
system. See Fisher (1911)
.
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NOTES
1. More detailed histories in English of Brazil's introduction of index-
linking are provided in Baer and Beckerman (1974); Beckerman ("The
Trouble . . ,)(1978); and Fishlow (1974). Histories in Portuguese are
given in Chacel, Simonsen, and Wald (1970); Ness (1977); and Simonsen
(1975).
2. It is important to understand that this was not really because of
the Brazilian usury law, which limited the annual interest on the govern-
ment's bonds to 12 per cent. Government bonds could always have been
sold at a discount to raise their effective yield above the anticipated
rate of inflation. What made government obligations unsaleable was the
uncertainty associated with the high rate of inflation, vhich rendered
the a priori real rate of return on any fixed-return security unacceptably
uncertain to the financial markets. Consequently, it would not have
helped much simply to raise the rate of return offered on government
obligations. The real rate of return had to be made not only positive,
but reasonably certain, and this could be accomplished only by index-
linking the securities ex post~~that is, readjusting their principals
periodically according to an appropriate price index.
3. A history of the formulas that have been used to re-adjust index-linked
assets is given in "Correcao monet^ria e realimentacao inf laciona'ria," in
Conjuntura Econflmica , June 1976, pp. 88-94.
4. Kampel and Miranda do Valle (1974) describes the Housing Finance
System in detail.
5. There is a growing literature on the question of why index-linked
assets heve not appeared spontaneously in private capital markets. See
usiug the Housing Finance System savings accounts for their spare cash,
& use that made the accounts quite volatile and contrary to their purpose.
20. Figures for the consumption of electrical energy in the Rio de Janeiro-
Sao Paulo-Micas Gerais area suggest that there was indeed such a recession.
The figures, in million kiiovatt-hours, are
September 1974; 1,663 January 1975: 1*587
October 1974: 1,584 February 1973; 1 S 5S6
November 1974; 1,654 March 1975; l s 590
December 1974; 1,581 April 1975: 1,640 l
(Bolettm do Banco Central do Brasil, March, 1977, pp. 149).
21. See "Corrsc&c monetaria e realimentacSo inflaciooaria," in
Conjuntura Scendaica;. June 1976, pp. 88-94.
22* Contador (1977),
23. Contador, p. 15.
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13. This writer has developed a model from which formal conditions can
be derived under which the effect on the IS of introducing financial
indsx-linking would be more important than the effect on the LM. See
Beccerman ("Index-linked Government Bonds . . .") (1978).
14. One might argue that the increase in international oil prices should
not be regarded in itself as inflationary, since for any given nation the
increase only represented a shift in relative prices. True enough; but in
Brazil and in many other nations the shift in relative prices inevitably
occasioned an increase in the demand for bank credit, and this caused an
increase in the money supply to the extent that the monetary authorities
permitted—or were forced to permit—the banking system to meet this demand.
15. See Beckerman, "The Trouble..." (1978) for a slightly more detailed
discussion of these developments.
16. See "Brazil counts its debts," The Economist , March 13, 1974, pp. 77-78.
17. Ness (1977) argues that the failure of nominal rates to rise suffi-
ciently was a major cause of the problems faced by the Brazilian financial
system after 1974.
18. See Conluntura Econ6mica , Octoher 1974, p. 48.
19. The new ruling provided that index-linking and interest would be paid
for a given month only on quantities deposited by the fifth of the month,
rather than the fifteenth cf the month as under the previous regulation.
Under the previous regulation savers could profitably invest funds in money-
market securities between the first and the fifteenth before returning the
funds to the savings accounts, thus earning from two sources on the funds.
(See Conjuntura Econflmica , November 1974, p. 32.) Enterprises had been
Gonjuntura Econfonica: f,Ccrrecao monetaria s realimentacSo inflacionaria,"
June. 197b, pp. 88-94.
Contador, CIa"udio, "CorrecHo monetaria, expectativa de InflacSo e a
demands por atlvos financeiros," Revista Brasileira de Mercado de
Capitals ;, January-April 197 6, pp. 5-25.
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unpublished paper, Rio de Janeiro, 1977.
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The first figure given for each month in Table 6b is the value:
- "'"June 1964
'
e
• VT '
If the formula (§) had actually been used to adjust the bonds beginning
in August 1964, this first figure would be 10.00. To the extent that our
calculated figure falls short from 10.00, therefore, the bonds have failed
to incorporate the full inflation (measured by the wholesale price index)
that occurred since July 1964. To determine the real rate of return (net
of interest) on a bond held between times t and t.. , calculate
V -V
1 o .
\
c
At least betweer: 1965 and 1974, our table shows that index-linked bonds
have pretty much, retained their value. Between any given dates, however,
the bonds do clearly have real gains or losses. The second figure given
for each month jihows the value
v a
June 1964
where G is the general price index.
'•5
The interpretation of Table 3 : The value of the index-linked bonds has
been determined each month by adjusting the previous month's value according
to the wholesale price index lagged several months, using the following
formula:
where V is the value of the bond at time t and L. is the wholesale
t t
price index. (Originally the index-linked bonds were adjusted every three
months, according to the formula:
X
t-4
+ Z
t-f
'
V - V -5= ^ ^ .)
* ^ It-7 + 1t-< + ^.9
The principal changes made in the calculation of the bond values were these:
in 1969 a new wholesale price index was used, removing the wholesale prices
of goods for export. In 1972 and 1973 a complicated formula was employed,
weighting the above formula by 60 percent and making the remaining 40 percent
of the formula depend on the government's target for inflation over the
coming period. During 1974 the previous formula was adopted again. In
August 1975 the wholesale price index was "purged" of price increases deemed
to have been the consequence of the agricultural failures that occurred
around that time, for purposes of calculating the bond readjustment. After
April 1976 the adjustment formula became (approximately)
:
\-2 + rt-3 + Xt-4 12
v
t -
°- 8 vi i i + 1 ' + 1 ; + °- 2vt-i (i - i5) •t-3 t-4 t-o
If the bonds were perfect hedges against inflation, the correction formula
would be
:
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TABLE 9. Gross national financial savings, 1972-1976.
(Millions of new cruzeiros) (provisional data)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Yearly flews
1. Monetary assets 17564 30006 31350 54152 67501
:
2. Time deposits* 7527 8794 7660 21097 18982
3. Exchange acceptances 6897 13847 7788 13201 11789
4. Government bills 6300 7196 -2599 22599 32500
5. Nominal fixed yield
assets: (2)+(3)+(4)*
20724 29837 12849 56897 63271
6. Saviigs deposits 3952 6409 14803 26309 51397
7. Housing bonds 1887 1502 1770 650 681
8. Government bonds 4410 4968 12057 27147 24612
9. Indes: linked assets:
(6)+<7)+(8)
10249 12879 28630 54106 76600
10. Forced savings programs 7419 10968 21593 29471 54525
11. Insurance companies'
techrJLcal reserves
316 276 545 802 756
12. Variable yield
securities
28282 42857 53362 83324 66950
13. Gross domestic
finar.cial savings
84579 126823 148329 278752 329693
14. Gross foreign
finat.cial savings
17636 17152 36665 34773 25622
15. Gross financial
savir.gs
102215 143975 184994 313525 355315
16. Gross domestic product 359133 477163 676617 897194 1397829.
17. (5) -: (13) 0. 24 0.24 0. 09 0..19 o'.19
18. (5) i (15) 0. 20 0.21 0. 07 0. 17 0.18
19. (5) s (16) 0. 06 0.06 0. 02 0. 06 0.05
20. (9) 4 (13) 0..12 0.10 0. 19 0. 19 0.23
21. (9) * (15) 0. 10 0.09 0. 15 0. 17 0.22
22. (9) * (16) 0.,03 0.03 0. 04 0..06 0.05
23. (13) * (16) 0. 23 0.27 0. 22 0.,31 e 0.24
24. (15) * (16) 0. 28 0.30 0.,27 0. 35 '0.25
*Certain time deposits at investment banks yield ex post index linking . TheF« — .
small in quantity. These are included with nominal time deposits.
Source: Boletim do Banco do Brasil, March 1977.
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